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I grew up in rural Appalachia, and now live and teach 
college in a similar area in Pennsylvania, the state in 
which sport hunting is the most popular. Thus, I have 
known many hunters, including family members, and 
have taught more than a few. The first day of buck 
season on the Monday after Thanksgiving invariably 
finds me teaching fewer people than usual. When the 
hunters have returned, buzzing with excitement about 
record "racks" (their word for antlers) or full of tales 
about the ones that got away, I ask them about their 
reasons for hunting. I hear much about the glories of 
communing with nature, the camaraderie of the hunt, 
the exci tement of the chase, and the delicious, allegedly 
pesticide-free meat some have in their freezers. Some 
of them assure me that they are sparing the killed deer 
slow, agonizing death by starvation in the coming winter 
(388,601 deer were "mercy killed" in Pennsylvania in 
1989. 1). The brightest ones tell me that they are 
contributing to the preservation of the ecosystem by 
keeping the hunted animals from overpopulating and 
degrading the environment. 
None of this holds up terribly well in the ensuing 
discussion. As Robert Loftin has pointed out, sport 
hunters use a numhcr of bad arguments in their attempts 
to justify what they do.2 Various scientific studies show 
that death at the hand of the hunter is seldom "clean" 
and frequently prolonged. Crippling cannot be avoided 
by even the most conscientious of hunters.3 Even if it 
could be known that the hunted animal would otherwise 
starve, it is far from clear that the latter fate would be 
more agonizing. Indeed, the claim that deer would 
starve if they were not hunted is itself questionable. 
Associate Professor of Silviculture Bruce Larson from 
the Yale Forestry School has admitted that "starvation" 
is the wrong term to use: "undernourishment" is far 
more accurate.4 In view of these facts, it is difficult to 
see sport hunters as mercy killers. 
It is also difficult to see them as saviors of the 
environment. As Loftin has documented, most hunted 
species would not overpopulate ifleft alone.s As others 
have pointed out, habitats are manipulated by such 
common practices as clearing brushland and damming 
streams in order to produce large numbers of hunted 
animals, much to the detriment of the environment.6 
Non-"game" animals are of little concern, unless they 
are predators who "compete," although not for sporting 
reasons, with sport hunters. For example, Alaskan 
officials, bending to the will of sport hunters who crave 
maximum numbers of moose, have been shooting 
wolves from helicopters.? None of this is surprising. 
Sport hunters want to hunt certain "favored" species: 
the ecosystem as a whole is not their primary concern. 
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Loftin supports hunting despite his devastating critique 
of its alleged benefits because sport hunters' contribute 
financially and politically to the preservation of animal 
habitats. However, surely there are other, ecologically 
sounder ways of achieving the same purpose.8 
I share all this information with my sport-hunting 
students. They are uneasy but remain resistant. When 
I ask them if the benefits they cite for themselves (fresh 
air, pancakes at 4:00 a. m., aerobic exercise, delicious 
food, and companionship) can only be achieved by 
hunting, they grudgingly agree that there are other ways. 
Nevertheless, most of them will continue to hunt despite 
the collapse of their arguments. Nothing else, they tell 
me, is quite like it. 
My colleague Bernard Rollin of Colorado State 
University also teaches hunters. He informs me that he 
is much meaner than I am. He forces the students to 
admit exactly what so enchants them about hunting for 
sport: the act of killing. The students are generally 
horrified by this admission. On one such occasion, a 
student began to cry. Few of us are heartened by the 
realization that we, or our fellow human beings, are 
enthusiastic killers. How can activity based on such a 
motive be justifiable? How can sport hunters continue 
to hunt, once they realize why they do it? 
Two recent Environmental Ethics articles in support 
of hunting attempt to answer these questions. Each fully 
admits that sport hunters kill for pleasure, and each holds 
that this is no cause for shame. The authors hold that 
activity based on the desire to kill can be morally 
justified. I will argue that neither of these startlingly 
honest articles succeeds in making its case. 
Ann Causey, in her very interesting and often 
sensitive "On the Morality of Hunting,"9 dismisses 
utilitarian and ecologically based arguments for sport 
hunting, noting that the objectives of maintaining 
healthy "game" and non-"game" animals, balanced 
ecosystems, opportunities for wholesome recreation, 
etc., can be achieved in better ways. However, she 
notes, the failure of these arguments is irrelevant to sport 
hunters: what counts in their eyes is their pleasure in 
the hunt and its deadly outcome. lO This very same 
pleasure is the particular object of the anti-hunters' scorn 
and anger. Causey believes that this passionate desire 
to kill can be both explained and defended. I I 
The explanation, she believes, is provided by two 
very different writers: Jose Ortega y Gasset12 and Roger 
Caras.13 Their suggestion is that the pleasure felt in 
completing the predatory act is a vestige ofour primitive 
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ongms. Causey, a biologist as well as a philosopher, 
agrees, holding that primitive humans would not have 
survived if they had not enjoyed killing: 
The instinct to kill was necessary for paleo-
lithic man. The pleasure resulting from 
satisfaction of that urge was also necessary in 
order to reinforce the urge and to ensure that 
it was fulfilled.14 
The language here is too teleological for scientific 
comfort, but it can easily be translated into evolutionary 
terms. The claim is that those of our ice-age dwelling 
ancestors who were innately predisposed to take 
pleasure in killing their prey satisfied their urge 
whenever possible. The resultant calories, protein, furs, 
etc., gave them a decided advantage over their 
nonhunting fellows. This advantage ensured their 
reproductive success, allowing them to pass on their 
genetically-based predilection for killing. Modem 
humans are the result, biologically programmed to seek 
and enjoy killing even when it is no longer necessary 
for survival. With Caras, Causey compares the joy of 
killing to the joy of sex: we want to do it even when it 
serves no biological purpose.1 5 The urge to kill is 
claimed to be as much a part of our genetic heritage as 
the urge to have sex, as is the pleasure resulting from 
satisfaction of that urge. As she puts it, according to 
this explanation of the sport hunter's motivation, "the 
urge to kill may be viewed as an original, essential 
human trait."16 
If the urge to kill is an instinct like the urge to have 
sex, Causey argues, it is a mistake to morally condemn 
it. These urges and the pleasures resulting from their 
satisfaction are beyond our conscious control. Although 
we can control the ways in which we act to satisfy these 
urges, and we can even refrain from acting on them 
altogether, we cannot help desiring to act on them, and 
we cannot eradicate the pleasure resulting from their 
successful completion. Hence, it is argued, sport hunters 
should not be construed as monstrous sadists. Their 
motivation is essentially amoral, not immoral.17 
It does not follow from this, as Causey recognizes, 
that the sport hunter's actions can be construed as 
amoral, let alone as morally justifiable.18 Hunters, like 
rapists and child molesters, may indulge their urges in 
morally reprehensible ways. However, the responsible 
sport hunter, Causey claims, does engage in "morally 
enriching" activity.19 He or she revels in closeness to 
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and appreciation of nature, is appalled by shooting 
wolves from helicopters, is very sensitive to the 
suffering of the hunted animals, and shows respect and 
admiration for the prey.20 Such a hunter actually feels 
remorse and sorrow for the victim, even while 
experiencing the thrill of the kill. (Causey believes that 
the hunter's negative feelings are due to the intrusion 
of reason on instinct).21 Sport hunters, she holds, have 
a "spiritual" need to maintain a "nostalgic" link to their 
distant pasts, a need that endows their activity with 
"sacramental value."22 Thus, she believes that what 
they do is morally defensible. 
In my view, Causey has neither offered a plausible 
explanation of the sport-hunter's motivation nor shown 
that sport hunting can be morally justified. Let us 
consider the explanation inspired by Ortega y Gasset 
and Caras first. 
The obvious objection to the claim that the urge to 
hunt and kill is an essential human instinct is the fact 
that a number of humans lack the urge. Some even 
have a "counter-urge." Causey herself discusses the 
view of "anti-hunters," who "believe instinctively that 
it is morally wrong to kill for pleasure."23 Short of 
denying the anti-hunters humanity, it seems that Causey 
must accept them as counter-examples to her contention. 
Causey addresses this objection in a footnote. She 
holds that those who lack the predatory urge exhibit 
"anomalous or nonadaptive behaviors."24 That is, they 
are said to be atypical. Just as damaged, nonrational 
humans do not undercut Aristotle's conception of 
humanity, anti-hunters, she could claim, are the rule-
proving exceptions.25 Causey later remarks that anti-
hunters would have as much success in converting the 
majority to their ranks as they would have in 
converting them to celibacy.26 The weight of instinct 
is simply too heavy. 
This reply certainly will not do. According to 
available evidence, the percentage of humans opposed 
to or uninterested in hunting for pleasure far exceeds 
th~ percentage who are sport hunters. U. S. Department 
of the Interior figures indicate that roughly 7% of the 
population hunts.27 Factoring out very young children 
and others who lack hunting opportunities would not 
much increase the percentage of hunters in the U. S. 
population. In Pennsylvania, where there is ample 
opportunity to hunt and interest in doing so is the highest 
in the nation, only 9% of the population hunts. 28 
Moreover, the percentage of anti-hunters among the 
nonhunters is appreciable. According to studies done 
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by Professor Stephen Kellert of Yale University, 60% 
of Americans do not approve of killing purely for sport, 
and 29% of the population object so strongly to sport 
hunting that they believe it should be banned.29 Surely 
even the smaller percentage is already far higher than 
the percentage of humans willing to devote themselves 
to permanent celibacy! In the circumstances, the urge 
to stalk and kill can hardly be "an essential human trait." 
Causey never considers alternatives to her highly 
speculative genetic account. Ice-age hunters would 
have been favored by natural selection whether or not 
they had an instinctive urge to kill and a reflexive 
pleasure response to the killing. Causey claims that 
the automatic pleasure response was necessary for the 
hunting to take place, but this is not the case. The 
avoidance of starvation would have been a sufficient 
initial incentive. Paleolithic humans could and 
doubtless did take pleasure in the cooking and eating 
of the slain animal, and the warmth of the resulting hides 
and furs. There is no need to assume that they must 
have been genetically programmed to feel thrilled by 
the act of killing itself. Of course, many might then 
have come to attach pleasure to the act itself, but this 
could well have been a culturally conditioned response. 
Certainly, no genetic explanation is necessary to account 
for the perpetuation of the hunting tradition by 
generations of humans. 
It is notoriously difficult to tease apart the genetic 
and environmental components of behavior, as Causey 
surely knows. In Pennsylvania, fathers typically teach 
their children, usually their sons, to hunt at an early 
age. Everything from fatherly approval and attention 
to having one's picture in the paper with proof of the 
kill works in favor of a pro-hunting attitude. Even the 
current President of the U. S. lends status to the 
occupation by hunting quail in Texas every year. AIl 
these positive feelings are aided by the attitude that the 
prey are "just animals," and as such are of little moral 
consequence. It would not be surprising if an activity 
perceived to have so much instrumental value came to 
be valued for its own sake by young hunters. 
Even so, many children resist, as the low percentage 
of hunters indicates. One of my colleagues, an avid 
hunter, once told me in exasperation that his 13-year-
old son had just ruined his chance to "get" his first buck. 
Although the child was in a perfect position to shoot 
the deer, he did not pull the trigger. "I couldn't do it, 
Dad," the boy explained: "he was looking right into 
my eyes!" Such children do not appear to be genetically 
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programmed to kill. Nor do former hunters who have 
become revolted by what they used to do. The ones I 
have known do not say that they still have a tremendous 
urge to hunt, but that now their consciences will not 
permit it: they appear to have undergone a "gut-level" 
transformation. None of this fits Causey's purported 
explanation of sport hunting. 
Even if Causey had succeeded in establishing her 
explanation, however, it would not have helped her to 
establish her defense of sport hunting, contrary to her 
claim. The alleged instinct to kill, termed "amoral" 
when Causey is trying to exempt it from moral 
condemnation, is, as we saw, later redescribed as a 
"spiritual" need and even a "sacramental value" whose 
realization should be "embraced."3o (George Reiger, 
enthusiastic hunter and editor ofField and Stream, uses 
the same sort of language, writing that "the ritual and 
traditions, and the emphasis on ethical behavior, liken 
this sport more to religion than the sciences we rely on 
to help perpetuate wildlife.")3l She wants to have it 
both ways, and it is far from clear that she can. Being 
"a nostalgic reminder of our precultural past,,32 is not 
enough to legitimize the move from "amoral" to 
"sacramental." If it were, bashing other human beings 
in the skull, at least those who don't belong to the 
contemporary equivalent ofour "tribe," would be a holy 
rite that we should all "embrace"!33 
Causey would probably reply that sport hunting and 
human skull bashing are not to be compared in moral 
terms because humans deserve more consideration than 
nonhumans. However, her conviction in this regard is 
not well-based. Those who morally object to hunting 
can argue from a rights basis or from the rejection of 
speciesist views that sanction the hunting ofnonhumans 
only. These approaches, which are not mutually 
exclusive, are rejected by Causey as "largely emotional,,34 
and "philosophically unsophisticated."35 Causey does 
not justify these blanket rejections, which appear to 
confuse the careful arguments of Tom Regan and Peter 
Singer (both cited in her article) with Walt Disney 
movies and literature from the Doris Day Animal 
League. 36 Although she cites a chapter from Paul 
Taylor's Respect for Nature in further support of her 
rejection ofa rights position for nonhurnans,37 that work 
actually goes against her view. (Taylor argues that 
according to the traditional view, only moral agents 
(persons) can have moral rights; but that under a 
modified conception, nonhumans (and humans!) who 
fail to be persons can be said to have rights. He argues 
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that moral agents owe such beings nonmaleficence, 
noninterference, fidelity, and restitutive justice. 
Although he does believe that it would be less confusing 
to restrict the language of rights to moral agents, he 
holds that the treatment wild beings are due from moral 
agents is the same they should receive if we were to 
attribute rights to them.38 This plainly puts sport hunting 
beyond the moral pale.) 
However, even if Causey had made a case for 
restricting moral rights to humans, it would not follow 
that the nostalgic pleasure experienced by sport hunters 
in search of their roots morally outweighs the resulting 
fear, pain, and destruction of animal lives. Causey 
clearly believes that the hunted animals are morally 
considerable, although she denies that they have rights. 
She repeatedly writes with very genuine-sounding 
outrage about the excesses of insensitive hunters, whom 
she refuses to call "genuine" sport hunters, since they 
lack all respect and concern for their targets.39 Even 
"sensitive" sport hunting exacts its toll, however, and 
Causey gives us no reason for thinking that this toll is 
justified by the sport hunter's joy. After all, there are a 
numberofless destructive ways to seek one's roots and 
celebrate one's connection to nature. Therefore, Causey 
has neither plausibly explained nor successfully 
defended the stalking and killing of animals for sport. 
It is Theodore Vitali who, in "Sport Hunting: Moral 
or Immoral?,"40 an independent recent article, tries to 
supply the needed defense for sport hunting. Unlike 
Causey, he is not concerned to explain the origin of the 
sport hunter's motivation: he concentrates on trying to 
show it morally justifiable. 
Vitali has a personal interest in supplying a defense. 
As an "embattled" sport hunter, as he describes himself, 
he is tired ofbeing regarded as a bloodthirsty redneck.41 
It is interesting that Causey herself might be reluctant 
to call him a "sport hunter," given her idealized 
conception of such a person as one who respects and 
admires the animals hunted, feeling a pang of regret 
mixed with joy on each occasion ofkilling. Vitali shows 
no signs ofregret, and writes less than respectfully about 
"taking of the game,"42 "prime game" vs. "poor quality" 
game,43 "racks," and "culling."44 He also defends 
"trophy" hunting, so long as species or ecosystems are 
not damaged by it,45 Causey herself appears to be 
repelled by trophy hunting, no doubt because it is 
difficult to find any sign of respect in the hanging of 
severed heads on living-room walls. In any case, 
however, Vitali does provide a better defense of sport 
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hunting than Causey. Nevertheless, as I shaIl argue, he 
too is unsuccessful. 
Vitali writes that basic moral principles enjoin us 
(I) not to "will evil as such" and (2) to create "a greater 
proportion of good over evil" by our actions.46 Let us 
accept this for the sake of argument. He also holds that 
pleasure as such is "a natural good" (by which he means 
"a nonmoral good"), as is life itself, whereas pain and 
death is "a natural evil" (or "nonmoral evil").47 Again, 
let us grant this. Vitali argues that a sport hunter who 
acts with the intention of causing death, a natural evil, 
and experiences pleasure as a result, would indeed 
behave immorally, for the hunter would be willing evil 
"as such," and the resulting pleasure would be 
insufficient to outweigh this evil.48 But this is not what 
generaIly motivates the sport hunter, according to Vitali: 
"the joy of hunting," he says, "seems to lie in the 
exercise of hunting skills, not in the death of the 
animal."49 The skills used in the "stalking and taking 
of game," as he puts it, are said to involve highly 
virtuous human traits such as intelligence, reason, 
emotional acuity, patience, physical coordination, and 
the like. It is this high degree of exceIlence, Vitali holds, 
that morally justifies the hunter's pleasure and 
outweighs the loss of life: 
Such exercise of human exceIlence, because 
it is humanly virtuous, is a sufficiently 
proportionate good to compensate for the loss 
of life engendered by the act of killing that 
completes the entire predational event.50 
This defense of hunting is superior to Causey's 
because Vitali at least tries to analyze the source of sport 
hunting's alleged value and to weigh that apparent value 
against the disvalue created. However, it is Vitali 
himself who raises an obvious objection to his defense.51 
Wouldn't far more good result if one exercised the skiIls 
used by the hunter for a nondestructive purpose instead, 
like nature photography? AIl the aIlegedly "inherently 
human skills"52 he lauds would still be practiced, but 
without any attendant loss of life. 
Vitali responds that no sport hunter could be satisfied 
with such an "ersatz" activity: 
The success or failure of these skills, and thus 
the joy or sorrow that results, depends 
ultimately, and in fact solely, upon the 
completion of the predatory event ... The act 
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of predation is the act of killing, and, for the 
human predator, it is the intended and decisive 
act of killing.53 
In other words, contrary to what Vitali earlier claimed, 
the sport hunter does have the primary intention of 
bringing about the death of the animal, and cannot be 
satisfied with anything less. The dilemma he earlier 
posed between taking pleasure in exercising skills and 
taking pleasure in the death of an animal is now 
exposed as a false one. The sport hunter does not so 
much crave the joy of killing as he or she craves the 
joy of skilled killing! 
I fail to see how adding the adjective above morally 
justifies sport hunting. Presumably, Vitali could argue 
that the sport hunter does not will natural evil alone, 
even though it is his or her primary intention to destroy 
life: the insistence that it be done skillfuIly means 
that good is also intended to result as part of the act. 
But it does not foIlow from this that the activity is 
moral. Even if one grants Vitali's highly dubious 
contentions that the skills involved are "inherently 
human"-if animal predators did not also possess some 
of these skills (physical coordination, patience, ability 
to plan), they would have long since been extinct-and 
exhibit a high degree of human virtue-Paul Taylor has 
pointed out that deception is a key element in sport 
hunting, and this is not known as a human virtue54-he 
has failed to make his case. We are given no argument 
for his claim that the exercise of "humanly virtuous" 
activity is sufficient to outweigh the toIl exacted on the 
hunted animal. 
It would not help Vitali at this point to claim, as he 
in fact believes,55 that animals have no moral rights for 
the sport hunter to violate. His argument focuses upon 
the creation and destruction of nonmoral good. He 
himself has claimed that animal life and well-being is 
good in this sense, as weIl as the pleasure and skillful 
activity of the hunter. Although the possession of moral 
rights by the animal would be sufficient to make the 
sport hunter's actions wrong, the animal's alleged lack 
of rights has no bearing on the balancing of nonmoral 
goods against nonmoral bads. We still are not told why 
the animal's fear, pain, and loss of life weighs so little 
compared to the sport hunter's thrill in skilled killing. 
If Vitali genuinely believes that the exercise of 
predational skills and the resulting pleasure of the 
successful sport hunter is sufficient to outweigh the 
suffering and death ofa being allegedly lacking in moral 
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rights, it is not justanimal hunting that would be justified 
on his terms. Like Causey, he uncritically accepts the 
traditional view that only those who are capable of a 
high degree of intelligence and autonomy can have 
moral rights. Accordingly, he draws the nonspeciesist 
conclusion that "any being" who ha<; never and can 
never meet this standard would have no moral rights.56 
It follows that a sport hunter whose chosen "game" is 
feral permanently retarded human children would be 
morally justified in stalking and killing them, so long 
as great skill is exercised and much joy results! The 
hunter would even be entitled to mount their little heads 
on the wall, although he or she might then have to be 
careful about whom to invite over for dinner. Those 
who accept Vitali's defense of sport hunting might want 
to reconsider at this point. 
In short, Vitali, as well as Causey, has not made a 
case for the moral justifiability of hunting for pleasure. 
Whatever the origin may be of the joy some take in 
killing, acting in pursuit of it remains highly 
questionable. It seems that hunter Ortega y Gasset was 
after all correct when he mused that "Reason can be 
described more appropriately as the greatest danger to 
the existence of hunting."57 
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51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., p. 77. 
53 Ibid., p. 78. 
54 Taylor, op. cit., p. 179. In a different context, Vitali 
dismisses Taylor's claim by pointing out that animals practice 
deception, too (p. 74, note 9). However, it does not follow 
from this that moral agents should do the same, particularly 
when they do it for pleasure rather than necessity. Causey 
also discusses Taylor on the deception issue, misinterpreting 
him by implying that this is his sole reason for rejecting sport 
hunting. According to Causey, Taylor would have to hold 
that the bow hunter who cleanly kills an animal after a 
necessarily deceptive stalk, afterwards making "full, 
nonfrivolous" use of the body, behaves more morally 
objectionably than the safari "hunter" who runs down the 
terrified prey in a Land Rover, shoots it with a semi-automatic 
weapon, and leaves the body to rot (except for the head). 
(Causey, op. cit., p. 340.) Taylor is committed to no such 
implication. His "duty of fidelity" (nondeception) to nature 
is only one of the duties he believes moral agents have to the 
wild. The overriding duty we have to wild creatures, he holds, 
is respectful treatment. Taylor objects to sport hunting on the 
grounds that it shows a lack ofrespect to that which we ought 
to respect ([aylor, pp. 274-276), not just on the grounds that 
it is deceptive. Obviously, the Land Rover hunter who uses 
heads for interior decoration shows less respect for wild 
creatures than Causey's highly idealized bow hunter. (Actual 
bow hunters don't measure up as well. In Texas, only half of 
all deer hit by arrows are retrieved by bow hunters. The rate 
of crippling and septic infection among umecovered deer is 
high. Deer who are retrieved slowly bleed to death, apparently 
in great pain. See "The American Hunter Under Fire," U. S. 
News and World Report, op. cit., p. 35, "Bow Hunting: A 
Most Primitive Sport," The Animals' Ageruia, May 1990, pp. 
15-18, and "Bowhunting Under Attack," Act'ionLine, Aprill 
May 1990, pp. 16-18.) 
55 Vitali, op. cit., pp. 73-75. 
56 Ibid., p. 75. 
57 Ortega y Gasset. op. cit., p. 46. (Cited by Causey, op. 
cit., p. 337). 
"The Joy of Killing" was written during spring, 
1990, when I was freed from teaching dUlies by 
my appointment as the 1990 Pennsylvania State 
University "Helena Rubinstein Endowed Fellow 
in the Humanities." 
Response 
A Defense of Pluhar 
Daniel Dombrowski 
Seattle University 
Integral to the defenses of hunting offered by 
Causey and Vitali is the claim that human beings are 
instinctive killers. Pluhar rightly disputes this claim 
on two grounds. 
(1) It is by no means clear that human beings have a 
basic urge to hunt and kill or that killing animals 
is an essential human trait, in that a number of 
human beings, indeed a majority, lack the urge. 
And as she correctly points out, the paleolithic 
humans who doubtless took pleasure in cooking 
and eating animals they had hunted may well 
have done so because they were hungry; there is 
no compelling reason to assume that their 
pleasure came from the act of killing itself. 
Further, ex-hunters generally do not claim that 
they have learned to control a tremendous urge 
to hunt, whereas previously they were victims 
of akrasia, but rather that they have had a gut-
level transformation such that they no longer 
even have the urge to hunt. 
(2) It is by no means clear that even if there were a 
basic human atavistic urge that it would 
automatically be permissible to hunt animals; 
likewise, the basic sexual urge in human beings, 
assuming for the moment that such an urge is 
basic, does not give a carte blanche to the rapist 
or child molester. 
The purpose of my response to Pluhar's paper is to 
reinforce these two criticisms of Causey and Vitali, a 
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